The German U-Boat

German U-Boats

The U-boat Campaign from 1914 to 1918 was the World War I naval campaign fought by German U-boats against the trade routes of the Allies.

It took place largely in the seas around the British Isles and in the Mediterranean.

The German Empire relied on imports for food and domestic food production (especially fertilizer) and the United Kingdom relied heavily on imports to feed its population, and both required raw materials to supply their war industry; the powers aimed, therefore, to blockade one another.

The British had the Royal Navy which was superior in numbers and could operate on most of the world’s oceans because of the British Empire, whereas the Imperial German Navy surface fleet was mainly restricted to the German Bight, and used commerce raiders and unrestricted submarine warfare to operate elsewhere.

In the course of events in the Atlantic alone, German U-boats sank almost 5,000 ships with nearly 13 million gross register tonnage, losing 178 boats and about 5,000 men in combat.

Other naval theatres saw U-boats operating in both the Far East and South East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and North Seas.

In August 1914, a flotilla of nine U-boats sailed from their base in Heligoland to attack Royal Navy warships in the North Sea in the first submarine war patrol in history.

Their aim was to sink capital ships of the British Grand Fleet, and so reduce the Grand Fleet’s numerical superiority over the German High Seas Fleet.

The first sortie was not a success.

Only one attack was carried out when U-15 fired a torpedo (which missed) at HMS Monarch. Two of the ten U-boats were lost.

Later in the month, the U-boats achieved success, when U-21 sank the cruiser HMS Pathfinder.

In September, SM U-9 sank three armoured cruisers (Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy) in a single action.

Other successes followed. In October U-9 sank the cruiser Hawke, and on the last day of the year, SM U-24 sank the pre-dreadnought battleship Formidably.

By the end of the initial campaign, the U-boats had sunk nine warships while losing five of their own number.

Mediterranean: Initial stage Main article: Mediterranean U-boat Campaign (World War I) The initial phase of the U-boat campaign in the Mediterranean comprised the actions by the Austro-Hungarian Navy’s U-boat force against the French, who were blockading the Straits of Otranto.

At the start of hostilities, the Austro-Hungarian Navy had seven U-boats in commission; five operational, two training; all were of the coastal type, with limited range and endurance, suitable for operation in the Adriatic. Nevertheless, they had a number of successes.

On 21 December 1914 U-12 torpedoed the French battleship, Jean Bart, causing her to retire, and on 27 April 1915 U-5 sank the French cruiser Léon Gambetta, with a heavy loss of life. But the Austro-Hungarian boats were unable to offer any interference to allied traffic in the Mediterranean beyond the Straits of Otranto.

Submarine warfare In 1914 the U-boat’s chief advantage was to submerge; surface ships had no means to detect a submarine underwater, and no means to attack even if they could, while in the torpedo the U-boat had a weapon that could sink an armoured warship with one shot.

Its disadvantages were less obvious but became apparent during the campaign.

While submerged the U-boat was virtually blind and immobile; boats of this era had limited underwater speed and endurance, so needed to be in position before an attack took place, while even on the surface their speed (around 15 knots) was less than the cruising speed of most warships and two thirds that of the most modern dreadnoughts.

The U-boats scored a number of impressive successes and were able to drive the Grand Fleet from its base in search of a safe anchorage, but the German Navy was unable to erode the Grand Fleet’s advantage as hoped.

Also, in the two main surface actions of this period, the U-boat was unable to have any effect; the High Seas Fleet was unable to draw the Grand Fleet into a U-boat trap.

Whilst warships were travelling at speed and on an erratic zigzag course they were relatively safe, and for the remainder of the war the U-boats were unable to mount a successful attack on a warship travelling in this manner

First attacks on merchant ships The first attacks on merchant ships had started in October 1914. At that time there was no plan for a concerted U-boat offensive against Allied trade.

It was recognised the U-boat had several drawbacks as a commerce raider, and such a campaign risked alienating neutral opinion. 

In the six months to the opening of the commerce war in February 1915, U-boats had sunk 19 ships,

 

Chemical Warefare

Chemical Warfare of World War 1

The use of toxic chemicals as weapons dates back thousands of years, but the first large scale use of chemical weapons was during World War I.

They were primarily used to demoralize, injure, and kill entrenched defenders, against whom the indiscriminate and generally very slow-moving or static nature of gas clouds would be most effective.

The types of weapons employed ranged from disabling chemicals, such as tear gas, to lethal agents like phosgene, chlorine, and mustard gas.

This chemical warfare was a major component of the first global war and the first total war of the 20th century.

The killing capacity of gas was limited, with about ninety thousand fatalities from a total of 1.3 million casualties caused by gas attacks.

Gas was unlike most other weapons of the period because it was possible to develop countermeasures, such as gas masks.

In the later stages of the war, as the use of gas increased, its overall effectiveness diminished.

The widespread use of these agents of chemical warfare, and wartime advances in the composition of high explosives, gave rise to an occasionally expressed view of World War I as “the chemist’s war” and also the era where weapons of mass destruction were created.

The use of poison gas by all major belligerents throughout World War I constituted war crimes as its use violated the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases and the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which prohibited the use of “poison or poisoned weapons” in warfare.

Widespread horror and public revulsion at the use of gas and its consequences led to far less use of chemical weapons by combatants during World War II

French Navy

French Navy of World War 1

At the outbreak of the First World War France had 19 battleships, 32 cruisers, 86 destroyers, 34 submarines, and 115 torpedo boats.

During the Dardanelles operation, the French Navy sent four battleships, six destroyers, and submarines. The battleship Bovet and four submarines were lost during this campaign.

The French Navy kept to the Mediterranean so the British Navy could recall most of her capital ships to the North Atlantic to counter the German fleet.

Following the 1904 Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, the French Navy policy was to concentrate its forces in the Mediterranean against a likely Italian-Austrian coalition, while maintaining a mainly defensive position in the north (North Sea, English Channel, Atlantic coast) where the Royal Navy would predominate.

French forces in this area initially included seven cruisers and a number of destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines for patrol duty in the western English Channel.

In the Mediterranean on the other hand was the 1st Armée Navale under the command of Adm de Lapeyrère

French Army

French Army of World War 1

During World War I, France was one of the Triple Entente powers allied against the Central Powers.

Although fighting occurred worldwide, the bulk of the fighting in Europe occurred in Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Alsace-Lorraine along what came to be known as the Western Front, which consisted mainly of trench warfare.

Specific operational, tactical, and strategic decisions by the high command on both sides of the conflict led to shifts in organizational capacity, as the French Army tried to respond to day-to-day fighting and long-term strategic and operational agendas.

In particular, many problems caused the French high command to re-evaluate standard procedures, revise its command structures, re-equip the army, and to develop different tactical approaches.

Over the course of the First World War, another five field armies would be raised.

The war scare led to another 2.9 million men being mobilized in the summer of 1914 and the costly battles on the Western Front forced France to conscript men up to the age of 45.

This was done by the mobilization in 1914 of the Territorial Army and its reserves; comprising men who had completed their peacetime service with the active and reserve armies (ages 20–34).

In June 1915, the Allied countries met in the first inter-Allied conference.

Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Serbia, and Russia agreed to coordinate their attacks but the attempts were frustrated by German offensives on the Eastern Front and spoiling offensives at Ypres and in the hills west of Verdun.

By 1918, towards the end of the war, the composition and structure of the French army had changed. Forty percent of all French soldiers on the Western Front were operating artillery and 850,000 French troops were infantry in 1918, compared to 1.5 million in 1915.

Causes for the drop in infantry include increased machine guns, armored cars, and tank usage, as well as the increasing significance of the French air force, the Service Aéronautique.

At the end of the war on November 11, 1918, the French had called up 8,817,000 men, including 900,000 colonial troops.

The French army suffered around 6 million casualties, including 1.4 million dead and 4.2 million wounded, roughly 71% of those who fought.

Nieuport 24

Nieuport 24 Aircraft of World War 1

In the summer of 1917, when the Nieuport 24 and 24bis began coming off the production line, many French fighter squadrons were replacing their Nieuport 17s with SPAD S.VIIs but some French units retained Nieuports into 1918 when they were effectively obsolete, although the type was preferred by some, especially the famous Charles Nungesser.

The type’s most notable accomplishment occurred when Nieuports of N152 were responsible for downing two Zeppelins, L49 and L50 during the night of 19–20 October 1917.

France’s allies operated them, including the Russians and the British. The Russians would continue to operate their Nieuports throughout the Russian Civil War, and even received 20 French-built Nieuport 24s after the Czar’s abdication.

Production of additional examples was undertaken by Dux, who had license-built previous Nieuports. Production was undertaken both before and after the Soviet victory. The Soviets would rename Dux to GAZ No 1 (Государственный авиационный завод № 1 or State Aviation Plant No. 1) and production continued until at least 1923.[6] Examples remained in service until at least 1925.

In the summer of 1917, the RFC still regarded deliveries of Nieuport scouts as a top priority although the 24 and 24bis were regarded as interim types pending Nieuport 27 deliveries.

Royal Aircraft Factory S.E.5 deliveries began shortly afterward, but a low production rate forced the British to use their Nieuport scouts operationally well into 1918.[8]

The Japanese bought several pattern aircraft and from 1921 to 1923 built 102, with work started by the Army Supply Depot at Tokorozawa until taken over by Nakajima.

These were later designated as the Ko 3, however, the Japanese did not distinguish between the 24 and the 27, initially calling both the Ni 24.

Most of their Nieuport 24s were fitted with the 80 hp (60 kW) Le Rhône 9C.

The Japanese operated them until 1926, much longer than they did their SPAD S.XIIIs, which were retired in 1922.

The Americans bought large numbers of Nieuport advanced trainers for their flying schools in France in November 1917, which either included 227 Nieuport 24s and 16 Nieuport 24bis or 121 Nieuport 24s and 140 Nieuport 24bis, depending on which source you believe, illustrating the difficulty in dealing with surviving source documents which often didn’t distinguish between the 24, 24bis and the 27.

The Soviet’s donated a Nieuport 24 and other types in 1921 to Afghanistan’s King Amanullah Khan. It still existed in 1924 when the Afghan Military Air Arm was formed.

The French Airforce

French Airforce of World War 1

French military aviation was born in 1909.

After the approval of the law by the French National Assembly on 29 March 1912,

French Military Aeronautics became officially part of the French Army, alongside the four traditional branches of the French Army, the infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers.

French aircraft during World War I, flying over German-held territory, 1915 France was one of the first states to start building aircraft.

At the beginning of World War I, France had a total of 148 planes (8 from French Naval Aviation (aéronautique Navale) and 15 airships.

By the time of the armistice in November 1918, 3608 planes were in service.

5,500 pilots and observers were killed from the 17,300 engaged in the conflict, amounting to 31% of endured losses.

A 1919 newspaper report reports the French Air Force had a 61% percent war loss.

Aeromarine 39

The Aeromarine 39 of World War 1

The Aeromarine 39 was an American two-seat training seaplane ordered by the US Navy in 1917 and built by the Aeromarine Plane and Motor Company of Keyport, New Jersey.

Of conventional biplane configuration and construction, the aircraft was designed so that its pontoons could be speedily detached and replaced with wheeled undercarriage for shore operations.

Fifty of the original design (later referred to as the 39A) were produced, featuring twin floats and powered by a Hall-Scott A-7 engine.

A redesign followed, increasing the wingspan to create more lift for water take-offs. This became known as the 39B. Other changes included a change to a single pontoon with outrigger floats, an enlarged vertical tail, and a change of powerplant to the Curtiss OXX.

On October 26, 1922, Godfrey DeCourcelles Chevalier landed a 39B on a moving ship, USS Langley, the first time this had been achieved on an American aircraft carrier.

Trials of underway carrier takeoffs and landings continued through 1922 and 1923.

Aeromarine origins: The Beginnings of Marine Aircraft, Winged Hulls, Air-cushion and Air-lubricated Craft, Planing Boats and Hydrofoils

The Airco DH-2

The Airco DH.2 of World War 1

The Airco DH.2 was a single-seat biplane “pusher” aircraft which operated as a fighter during the First World War. 

It was the second pusher design by aeronautical engineer Geoffrey de Havilland for Airco, based on his earlier DH.1 two-seater.

The design of DH.2 was greatly influenced by the technologies available at the time, as Britain had not yet developed a synchronisation gear to match the German system, this had compelled British fighters to adopt the pushed configuration, such as the DH.2 and the F.E.2b. 

Development of the type had begun before the emergence of the German’s Fokker Eindecker monoplane fighter; these two aircraft became fierce adversaries following the DH.2’s introduction. During July 1915, the prototype DH.2 performed its maiden flight; it was lost during the following month on the Western Front.

Introduced to frontline service in February 1916, the DH.2 became the first effectively armed British single-seat fighter. 

Its availability enabled Royal Flying Corps (RFC) pilots to counter the “Fokker Scourge” that had given the Germans the advantage in the skies during late 1915. It carried the burden of fighting and escort duties for almost two years, while numerous pilots became flying aces using the type. 

It became outclassed by newer German fighters, contributing to the DH.2’s withdrawal from first line service in France after RFC units were completely re-equipped with newer fighters, including the Airco DH.5, during June 1917.

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The Fokker Scourge

The Fokker Scourge of World War 1

The Fokker Scourge (or Fokker Scare) occurred during the First World War from August 1915 to early 1916, when the Imperial German Flying Corps (Die Fliegertruppen), equipped with Fokker Eindecker fighters, gained an advantage over the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the French Aéronautique Militaire.

The Fokker was the first service aircraft to be fitted with a machine gun synchronised to fire through the arc of the propeller without striking the blades.

The tactical advantage of aiming the gun by aiming the aircraft and the surprise of its introduction were factors in its success.

This period of German air superiority ended with the arrival in numbers of the French Nieuport 11 and British Airco DH.2 fighters, which were capable of challenging the Fokkers, although the last Fokkers were not finally replaced until August–September 1916.

The term “Fokker Scourge” was coined by the British press in mid-1916, after the Eindeckers had been outclassed by the new Allied types.

Use of the term coincided with a political campaign to end a perceived dominance of the Royal Aircraft Factory in the supply of aircraft to the Royal Flying Corps, a campaign that was begun by the pioneering aviation journalist C. G.

Grey and Noel Pemberton Billing M.P., founder of Pemberton-Billing Ltd (Supermarine from 1916) and a great enthusiast for aerial warfare

As aerial warfare developed, the Allies gained a lead over the Germans by introducing machine-gun armed types such as the Vickers F.B.5 Gunbus fighter and the Morane-Saulnier L.

By early 1915, the German Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, Army supreme command) had ordered the development of machine-gun-armed aircraft, to counter those of the Allies.

The new “C” class armed two-seaters and twin-engined “K” (later “G”) class aircraft such as the AEG G.I were attached in ones and twos to Feldflieger Abteilungen (artillery-observation and reconnaissance detachments) for “fighter” sorties, mostly the escort of unarmed aircraft.

On 18 April 1915, the Morane-Saulnier L of Roland Garros was captured, after he was forced to land behind the German lines.

From 1 April, Garros had destroyed three German aircraft in the Morane, which carried a machine-gun firing through the propeller arc. Bullets that hit the blades were deflected by small metal wedges.

Garros burned his aircraft but this failed to conceal the nature of the device and the significance of the deflector blades.

The German authorities requested several aircraft manufacturers, including that of Anthony Fokker, to produce a copy.

Synchronisation gear Main article:

Synchronization gear Detail of an early Fokker Eindecker: the cowling is off, showing the prototype form of the Stangensteuerung gear, connected directly to the oil pump drive at the rear of the engine.

The Fokker company produced the Stangensteuerung (push rod controller), a genuine synchronisation gear. Impulses from a cam driven by the engine controlled the firing of the machine-gun so it could fire forwards without damaging the propeller.]

Unlike earlier proposed gears the Stangensteuerung was fitted to an aircraft and proved in flight. In a postwar biography, Fokker claimed that he produced the gear in 48 hours but it was probably designed by Heinrich Lübbe, a Fokker Flugzeugbau engineer.

Among several pre-war patents for similar devices was that of Franz Schneider, a Swiss engineer who had worked for Nieuport and the German LVG company.

The device was fitted to the most suitable Fokker type, the Fokker M.5K (military designation Fokker A.III), of which A.16/15, assigned to Otto Parschau, became the prototype of the Fokker E.I.

Fokker demonstrated A.16/15 to German fighter pilots, including Kurt Wintgens, Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann in May and June 1915.

The Fokker, with its “Morane” controls, including the over-sensitive balanced elevator and dubious lateral control, was difficult to fly; Parschau, who was experienced on Fokker A types, converted pilots to the new fighter.

The early Eindeckers were attached to the normal FFA in ones and twos, to protect reconnaissance machines from Allied machine-gun-armed aircraft.

Operational service Service début Otto Parschau’s second Eindecker, E.1/15, with experimental “mid-wing” modification which became standard on production E.Is Fokker Eindecker E.5/15, the last of the pre-production series, is believed to have been first flown in action by Kurt Wintgens of FFA 6.

On 1 and 4 July 1915, he reported combats with French Morane-Saulnier L (Parasols), each time well over the French lines.

These victories were never confirmed, although later research has shown that the first claim matches French records of a Morane forced down on 1 July near Lunéville with a wounded crew and a damaged engine, followed three days later by another.

By 15 July, Wintgens had moved to FFA 48 and scored his first recognised victory, another Morane L.

Parschau had received the new E.1/15, which became the prototype for the Fokker Eindecker line of aircraft, when it was returned to the Fokker Flugzeugbau factory in Schwerin–Gorries, for development.

By the end of July 1915, about fifteen Eindeckers were operational with various units, including the five M.5K/MGs and about ten early production E.I airframes.

At first, the pilots flew the new aircraft as a sideline, when not flying normal operations in two-seater reconnaissance aircraft.

Boelcke, in FFA 62, scored his first victory in an Albatros C.I on 4 July.

M.5K/MG prototype airframe E.3/15, the first Eindecker delivered to FFA 62, was armed with a Parabellum MG14 gun, synchronised by the troublesome first version of the Fokker gear.

At first, E.3/15 was jointly allocated to him and Immelmann when their “official” duties permitted, allowing them to master the type’s difficult handling characteristics and to practice shooting at ground targets.

Immelmann was soon allocated a very early production Fokker E.I, E.13/15, one of the first armed with an lMG 08 Spandau machine gun, using the more reliable production version of the Fokker gear.

The Scourge begins RFC aircraft losses (July 1915 to January 1916)

Month Total June 6 July 15 August 10 September 14 October 12 November 16 December 17 January 30 Total 120 The Fokker Scourge is usually considered to have begun on 1 August, when B.E.2c aircraft of No. 2 Squadron bombed the base of FFA 62 at 5:00 a.m., waking the German pilots, including Boelcke and Immelmann, who were quickly into the air after the raiders.

Boelcke suffered a jammed gun but Immelmann caught up with a B.E.2c and shot it down. This aircraft was flown as a bomber, without an observer or Lewis gun, the pilot armed only with an automatic pistol.

After about ten minutes of manoeuvring (giving the lie to exaggerated accounts of the stability of B.E.2 aircraft) Immelmann had fired 450 rounds, which riddled the B.E. and wounded the pilot in the arm.

By late October, towards the end of the Battle of Loos, more Fokkers (including the similar Pfalz E-type fighters, which were also called “Fokkers” by Allied airmen) were encountered by RFC pilots and by December, forty Fokkers were in service.

The new fighters could make long, steep dives and the fixed, synchronised machine gun was aimed by aiming the aircraft. The machine gun was belt-fed, unlike the drum-fed Lewis guns of their opponents, who had to change drums when in action.

The Fokker pilots took to flying high and diving on their quarry, usually out of the sun, firing a long burst and continuing the dive until well out of range.

If the British aircraft had not been shot down, the German pilot could climb again and repeat the process. Immelmann invented the Immelmann turn, zoom after the dive, followed by a roll when vertical to face the opposite way, after which he could turn to attack again.

The mystique acquired by the Fokker was greater than its material effect and in October, RFC HQ expressed concern at the willingness of pilots to avoid combat.

RFC losses were exacerbated by the increase in the number of aircraft at the front from 85 to 161 between March and September, the hard winter of 1915–1916 and some aggressive flying by the new German “C” type two-seaters.

Boelcke and Immelmann continued to score, as did Hans Joachim Buddecke, Ernst von Althaus and Rudolph Berthold from FFA 23 and Kurt von Crailshein of FFA 53.

The “official” list of claims by Fokker pilots for the second half of 1915 was no more than 28, many of them over French aircraft. Thirteen aeroplanes had been shot down by Immelmann or Boelcke and the rest by seven other Fokker pilots.

January 1916 brought thirteen claims, most of them against the French, followed by twenty more in February, the last month of the “scourge” proper.

Most of the victories had been scored by aces rather than the newer pilots flying the increased number of Fokkers.

Allied casualties had been light by later standards but the loss of air superiority to the Germans, flying a new and supposedly invincible aircraft, caused dismay among the Allied commanders and lowered the morale of Allied airmen.

In his memoir Sagittarius Rising (1936), Cecil Lewis wrote, Hearsay and a few lucky encounters had made the machine respected, not to say dreaded by the slow, unwieldy machines then used by us for Artillery Observation and Offensive Patrols.

Reproduction FE2b, Masterton, New Zealand, 2009 The RFC changed tactics for the sedate B.E. types and the newer F.E.2b pusher fighters.

On 14 January, RFC HQ issued orders that until better aircraft arrived, long and short-range reconnaissance aircraft must have three escorts flying in close formation.

If contact with the escorts was lost, the reconnaissance must be cancelled, as would photographic reconnaissance to any great distance beyond the front line. Sending the B.E.2c into action without an observer armed with a machine gun also became less prevalent.

The new tactic of concentrating aircraft in time and space had the effect of reducing the number of reconnaissance sorties the RFC could fly in support of the army.

New defensive formations were devised; a II Wing RFC method was for the reconnaissance aircraft to lead, escorted on each side 500 ft (150 m) higher, with another escort 1,000 ft (300 m) behind and above.

On 7 February, on a II Wing long-range reconnaissance, the observation pilot flew at 7,500 ft (2,300 m); a German aircraft appeared over Roulers and seven more closed in behind the formation.

West of Thourout, two Fokkers arrived and attacked at once, one diving on the reconnaissance machine and the other on an escort.

Six more German aircraft appeared over Courtemarck and formed a procession of 14 aeroplanes stalking the British formation.

None of the German pilots attacked and all the British aircraft returned, only to meet two German aircraft coming back from a bombing raid, which opened fire and mortally wounded the pilot of one the British escort aircraft.

The British ascribed their immunity to attack during the 55-minute flight to the rigid formation, which the two Fokkers were unable to disrupt.

On 7 February, a No. 12 Squadron B.E.2c. was to be escorted by three B.E.2c, two F.E.2 aircraft and a Bristol Scout from 12 Squadron and two more F.E. and four R.E. aeroplanes from No. 21 Squadron.

The flight was cancelled due to bad weather but twelve escorts for one reconnaissance aircraft demonstrated the effect of the Fokkers in reducing the efficiency of RFC operations.

British and French reconnaissance flights to get aerial photographs for intelligence and ranging data for their artillery had become riskier, in spite of German fighters being forbidden to fly over Allied lines (in an attempt to keep the synchronisation gear secret).[

This policy, for various reasons, prevailed for most of the war; the rarity of German fighters appearing behind the Allied lines limited the degree of air superiority they were able to attain.

End of the Scourge The red Nieuport 11 of Jean Navarre, Guardian of Verdun The beginning of the end of the scourge came at the Battle of Verdun (21 February – 20 December).

An attempt to impose an air barrage (Luftsperre) had largely concealed the German preparations for the offensive from French aerial reconnaissance.

During March and April increasing numbers of the new French Nieuport 11 fighters were sent to Verdun.

Organised in specialist fighter squadrons (escadrilles de chasse) the Nieuports could operate in formations larger than the singletons or pairs normally flown by the Fokkers, quickly regaining air superiority for the Aéronautique Militaire.

British F.E.2b pusher aircraft had been arriving in France from late 1915 and in the New Year began to replace the older F.B.5s.

The pilot and observer had a good view forwards from their cockpits and the observer could also fire backwards over the tail.

No. 20 Squadron, the first full F.E. unit, arrived in France on 23 January 1916, for long-range reconnaissance and escort flying.

The Fokker pilots attacked the F.E.s without hesitation but soon found that the new aircraft could be formidable opponents, particularly when flying in formation. What the F.E. lacked was sufficient speed and manoeuvrability to pursue and attack the Fokkers.

D.H.2 taking off from the airfield at Beauval, France Another pusher, the Airco DH.2 single-seat fighter, began to arrive at the front in February 1916.

This aircraft had a modest performance but its superior manoeuvrability gave it an advantage over the Eindecker, especially once a clamp was fitted to its Lewis gun so it could be fixed to fire forwards.

On 8 February, No. 24 Squadron (Major Lanoe Hawker) arrived with D.H.2s and began patrols north of the Somme; another six D.H.2 squadrons followed.

On 25 April, two of the D.H. pilots were attacked and found that they could out-manoeuvre the Fokkers; a few days later, without opening fire, a D.H. pilot caused a Fokker to crash onto a roof at Bapaume.

The Nieuports proved even more effective when the first Nieuport 16s in British service were issued to No. 1 and No. 11 Squadrons in April.

By March 1916, despite frequent encounters with Fokkers and the continued success of the German Eindecker aces, the scourge was over.

The bogey of the Fokker Eindecker as a fighter was finally laid in April when an E.III landed by mistake on a British aerodrome.

The captured aircraft was found not to have the superior performance it had been credited with.

The first British aircraft with a synchronisation gear was a Bristol Scout, which arrived on 25 March 1916 and on 24 May the first Sopwith 1½ Strutter aircraft were flown to France by a flight of No. 70 Squadron.

End of the Eindecker Halberstadt D.II, said to be one of Boelcke’s aircraft The impact of the new Allied types, especially the Nieuport, was of considerable concern to the Fokker pilots; some even took to flying captured examples.

Idflieg was sufficiently desperate to order German firms to build Nieuport copies, of which the Euler D.I and the Siemens-Schuckert D.I were built in quantity.

New D type single-seat biplane fighters, particularly the Fokker D.II and Halberstadt D.II, had been under test since late 1915 and the replacement of the monoplanes with these types had begun by mid-1916.

] In February 1916, Inspektor-Major Friedrich Stempel began to assemble Kampfeinsitzer Kommando (KEK, single-seat battle units).

The KEK were units mostly of two to four fighters, equipped with Eindeckers and other types which had served with FFA units during the winter of 1915–1916. By July 1916, KEK had been formed at Vaux, Avillers,

Jametz and Cunel near Verdun as well as other places on the Western Front, as Luftwachtdienst (aerial guard service) units, consisting only of fighters.

In the second half of May, German air activity on the British front decreased markedly, while the commander of the new Luftstreitkräfte, Oberst Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen, reorganised the German air service.

The fighters of the KEK were concentrated into fighter squadrons (Jagdstaffeln) the first of which, Jagdstaffel 2 (Jasta 2) went into action on the Somme on 17 September.

By this time, the last of the Eindeckers, long outmoded as front line fighters, had been retired from the front line.

Fokker D.VII Hermann Goering WWI Plane Aviation Aircraft Painting Art Print

The Gotha G.V Bomber

The Gotha G.V Bomber of World War 1

The Gotha G.V was a heavy bomber used by the Luftstreitkräfte (Imperial German Air Service) during World War I.

Designed for long-range service, the Gotha G.V was used principally as a night bomber.

Operational use of the Gotha G.IV demonstrated that the incorporation of the fuel tanks into the engine nacelles was a mistake.

In a crash landing, the tanks could rupture and spill fuel onto the hot engines.

This posed a serious problem because landing accidents caused 75% of operational losses.

In response, Gothaer produced the G.V, which housed its fuel tanks inside the fuselage.

The smaller engine nacelles were mounted on struts above the lower wing.

The Gotha G.V pilot seat was offset to port, with the fuel tanks immediately behind.

This blocked the connecting walkway that previously on earlier machines allowed crew members to move between the three gun stations.

All bombs were carried externally in this model. The base variant of G.V offered no performance improvement over the G.IV. 

The G.V was up to 450 kg (990 lb) heavier than the G.IV due to additional equipment and the use of insufficiently seasoned timber.

The Mercedes D.IVa engines could not produce the rated 190 kW (260 hp) due to inferior quality of fuel. Gotha tunnel

The Gotha included an important innovation in the form of a “gun tunnel”, whereby the underside of the rear fuselage was arched, early versions allowing placement of a rearward-facing machine gun, protecting against attack from below, removing the blind spot.

Later versions expanded the tunnel to remove the lower gun, providing a slot in the upper fuselage that allowed the rear gunner to remain stationary.

Roden 016, Gotha G.V WW I model kit